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Abstract
In this paper, we study how foreign ownership of Swedish companies affects
employment and wages. To study these effects, we specify a model based on
the assumption that the Swedish labour market can be described as one where
trade unions and employers bargain over employment and wages. Our hypothesis is
that bargaining power is affected by institutional settings and the ownership of the
firm. To test our hypothesis, we used a panel data set of 242 large Swedish
manufacturing firms over the period 1980–2005. The results indicate no significant
impact of foreign ownership on employment or wages in Sweden.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine how foreign ownership of companies acting in
Sweden has affected the employment and wage setup. Although Sweden has a tradition
of labour market agreements such as collective bargaining between unions and em-
ployers, the assumption in the present paper is that foreign-owned firms are not as
committed to this “social contract” as domestically owned firms are, which makes the
threat of foreign-owned business activities moving out of Sweden credible. This line of
reasoning reflects public debate on this issue. According to our hypothesis, then, for-
eign ownership will exert a downward pressure on wages in a unionised labour market.
Sweden, with its traditionally strong unions, provides an interesting case study for this
hypothesis.
Due to globalisation as well as the deregulation of capital markets, capital move-
ments have increased steadily in recent years. As a result, the number of people
employed in foreign-owned firms has also increased rapidly: in Sweden, for example,
the share of individuals employed in firms controlled by foreign owners (defined in this
paper as a firm where a foreign owner holds more than half of the voting rights of the
enterprise in question, either directly or through a parent company) more than qua-
drupled between 1980 and 2005 (see Fig. 1). At the end of 2005, over 20 % of all em-
ployees in Sweden were working for foreign-owned firms; for the manufacturing sector
studied here, the share was substantially higher.
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Such an increase of foreign control may well have affected labour market conditions.
In a number of countries, fear that foreign ownership could lead to worsened labour
market conditions has been an important component of the domestic policy debate,
and this concern has been reflected in the literature as well. Authors such as Bughin
and Vannini (1995) and Radulescu and Robson (2008), for example, take it as given that
foreign-owned firms have the option of ignoring local unions. Cowling and Sugden
(1987), Huizinga (1990), and Ramsay (1995), similarly, take for granted that increased
importance of international investment flows will reduce the bargaining power of na-
tional unions. The implicit hypothesis is that a switch from domestic to foreign owner-
ship has a detrimental effect on a trade union’s bargaining power, as foreign owners
can make more credible threats than domestic owners of moving the activity abroad,
and that this may then affect both employment and wages.
To accomplish our objectives, we will specify a model that is essentially based on the
assumption that the Swedish labour market can be described as one where trade unions
and employers bargain over both employment and wages (Alogoskoufis and Manning
1991). The intuition is that bargaining power, which affects both equilibrium wage and
equilibrium employment levels, may be modelled as a function of various industry and
labour market characteristics, including type of ownership. To test our hypothesis, we
used a panel data set of 242 firms operating during the period 1980–2005.
One reason that we chose to conduct the analysis with a bargaining model of this
kind is that Sweden has a long history of high trade union density among workers in
manufacturing industries; apart from a few years in the 1980s when Denmark’s trade
union density was slightly higher, Sweden’s trade union density has been the highest
among the industrialised countries throughout the period studied in this paper. This
also means that to the extent that unions’ bargaining power is affected by increased for-
eign ownership, this effect should be more pronounced in Sweden—where unions’ bar-
gaining power was clearly very high to begin with—than in countries where unions
were never particularly strong in the first place.
Fig. 1 Share and number of foreign companies in Sweden and their share of employed individuals,
1980–2010. Source: Swedish Agency for Growth Policy Analysis
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents previous literature in
the field, while Section 3 outlines the theoretical model underlying our empirical
model. Here, we do not explicitly take foreign ownership into consideration but instead
focus on how employment and wages may be determined in a unionised economy and
how the respective bargaining power of the union and the employer may affect wage
and employment outcomes. In Section 4, we present the data used in the empirical
analysis. Section 5 sets up our econometric model, which takes foreign ownership into
account. The results from the econometric model are presented in Section 6, after
which Section 7 offers some concluding comments.
2 Previous literature
In a recent study, Dumont et al. (2012) show that the bargaining position of low-skilled
labour appears to fall with increases in imports and offshoring, while the bargaining
power of high-skilled workers is affected positively by research and development activ-
ities. They found that trade unions seemed to focus on wages rather than employment.
Moreover, Modén (1998) revealed that foreign ownership led to an increase in labour
productivity in Swedish manufacturing, implying a reduction in employment (at least
in the short run); however, Bandick and Karpaty (2011) found no negative impact of
foreign ownership on employment. Navaretti et al. (2003) found that, for any given
wage increase, multinational firms reduced total employment less than national firms
did. These authors (ibid.) also established that labour market regulations were largely
irrelevant to the labour market behaviour exhibited by multinational firms and con-
cluded that concerns about labour market regulation scaring off foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) seemed unfounded.
There are by now several theoretical studies trying to explain the effect of the flow of
FDI on wages and employment. Most of these studies employ a Nash bargaining ap-
proach to model the strategic bargaining relationship between a union and a firm.
Bughin and Vannini (1995), using such a model, established that trade unions were in-
different when it came to choosing between exporting or investing abroad. Naylor and
Santoni (2003) argued that FDI in a potential host country was more likely if the union
wage-bargaining power in that country was weaker and if there was a lower degree of
substitutability between potential rivals’ products. Zhao (1995) and Zhao (1998) found
that, with symmetric FDI flows in both directions, the negotiated wage decreased for
every level of employment, while each firm’s profit increased; such FDI flows increased
employment and national welfare if the union was wage-oriented but decreased em-
ployment and national welfare if the union was employment-oriented.
A number of empirical studies have examined the effects of foreign ownership on
wages. A frequent finding is that foreign-owned firms are more productive than domes-
tically owned firms, although this finding tends to be sensitive to the exact specification
used. This higher productivity in turn tends to translate into higher wages, although
this effect frequently increases the equilibrium wage in the entire sector and thus spills
over into domestically owned firms in the same sector as well (see e.g. Lipsey 1994;
Feliciano and Lipsey 1999). Concerning ownership per se, Hatzius (2000) presented evi-
dence to the effect that the bargaining power of employees was reduced when domestic
(British) firms were acquired by foreign owners. Aitken et al. (1996) investigated the
wages paid by domestic and foreign-owned firms in Mexico, the USA, and Venezuela.
Brännlund et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:8 Page 3 of 17
They presented evidence that foreign investment in a sector led to higher productivity
and higher wages, but that (at least for the USA) wages also increased in domestically
owned firms in the same sector. Girma et al. (2001) found, for the UK, that a large
share of the difference in productivity was linked to larger size and larger capital inten-
sity of foreign-owned firms. They found little indication of wage spillovers from
foreign-owned firms to domestically owned firms, although they noted that the econo-
metric specification that they used may have masked some of the spillover effects.
Conyon et al. (2002), using a short panel of UK firms that were acquired either by
foreign or by new domestic owners, found that wages increased by 3.4 % when foreign in-
vestors acquired the companies compared to when the companies were acquired by new
domestic owners; they attributed the entire wage difference to productivity differences.
Griffith and Simpson (2003) also established a positive premium for foreign-owned com-
panies in the UK but attributed the entire wage and productivity difference to differences
in investment levels. For Portugal, Almeida (2007) presented evidence that the workforce
in foreign-owned companies was more highly skilled and was paid a higher wage pre-
mium than in domestically owned companies but also found that these differences were
entirely attributable to cherry picking of acquisition objects by foreign investors. Also
studying Portugal, Martins (2004) revealed a positive average-wage premium for the years
1991–1999 but found successively smaller premia when controls were added for firm type
and worker type. Using Finnish data, Huttunen (2007) established that, when Finnish
companies passed into foreign ownership, the wage dispersion within the companies in-
creased. However, in a related study of Brazil, Martins and Esteves (2008) found no evi-
dence that foreign acquisitions resulted in higher wage premiums; instead, such takeovers
tended to decrease the demand for labour.
To sum up, one could say that, in general, foreign ownership tends to increase the
wage rate, largely because of improved labour productivity, and that at least some stud-
ies have found that these wage increases spill over into other firms in the same sector.
Nonetheless, it needs to be borne in mind that most of the previous studies have
looked at labour markets considerably less unionised than Sweden’s. It also needs to be
borne in mind that the type of firm acquired by foreign investors may be different from
an average firm, in the country and even in the same sector.
3 The model
We use a bargaining model first developed by Manning (1987). We derive the struc-
tural equations for determining employment and wages on the assumption that both
are sequentially negotiated between an employer and a trade union and that these par-
ties are completely informed. The resulting model will be used as the basis for an em-
pirical analysis in Section 4. The basic idea here is that the employer seeks to maximise
profit, given a production technology, and that the union seeks to maximise its mem-
bers’ utility. How well each party succeeds depends on its bargaining strength. Bargain-
ing strength may, in turn, depend on a number of different things, one of which is the
institutional setting. In this paper, we ultimately set out to test whether foreign owner-
ship affects employment and wage-setting, and our hypothesis is that if there is an ef-
fect, this effect may be transferred through the trade union’s bargaining power.
In most collective bargaining, there is a two-stage negotiation process where wages
are determined prior to employment. In Sweden, such employment contracts often last
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for a year or two. Partly because of this, trade unions may act differently—and may
have a different bargaining power—when negotiating about wages, compared to when
they are negotiating about employment. Manning (1987) offers a theoretical explan-
ation for this phenomenon. Firstly, owing to uncertainty and the impossibility of con-
cluding complete contracts that will cover all the possible scenarios and supplements,
it may be best to reach agreement on wages first and then determine employment. Sec-
ondly, wage negotiations are mostly carried out at a higher level, e.g. nationally, while
employment levels are usually negotiated at plant level.
To start, we assume that supply of labour is given by a set of workers, where each
worker has a unit of labour that they supply with no disutility. Furthermore, the mem-
bers of the trade union are assumed to have identical preferences that are represented
by the following (indirect) utility function:
U ¼ Pu wð Þ þ 1−Pð Þu Rð Þ ð1Þ
where w denotes the real wage, P is the probability of being employed in the firm and
R denotes the expected real income of a worker who loses his/her job in the firm (the
reservation wage). u(·) is strictly increasing and concave. If we normalise the labour
force to unity, the union utility function (1) can be written as
U w; L; Rð Þ ¼ Lu wð Þ þ 1−Lð Þu Rð Þ ð2Þ
where L is the share of the labour force that is employed and (1 − L) the unemployed
share.
The profit-maximising firm is assumed to use labour, L, and capital, K, and a strictly
concave technology, f, to produce its output. Assuming that capital is fixed in the short
run, the firm’s short-run profit can be written as
Π L; K ; p; wð Þ ¼ pf L; Kð Þ−wL ð3Þ
where p is the price of output.
The first stage in the negotiation process between firm and trade union is where the
parties bargain over the wage. In the second stage, the parties bargain over the employ-
ment level—subject to the negotiated wage from the first stage. The negotiation process
between the union and employer is formalised by the strategic model of bargaining be-
tween completely informed players. This can be set up as a Nash product, where the
objective is to maximise a weighted product of the union’s utility and the firm’s profit.
The weights are determined by the bargaining power, which in turn is a function of a
vector of variables, z, such as institutional setting, firm characteristics, labour market
conditions and type of ownership. The problem can be solved backwards, i.e. by solving
for the employment conditional on a given wage, as follows:
max
L
U w; L; Rð Þ−U0ð ÞΦ2 zð Þ Π L; K ; p; wð Þ−Π0ð Þ1−Φ2 zð Þ ð4Þ
where Φ2 ∈ [0, 1] is the union’s bargaining power over employment. If Φ2 = 0, the firm
sets the employment level. U0 and Π0 are the fallback utility and fallback profit, as-
sumed to be given by U0 = u(R) and Π0 = 0, respectively.
The first-order condition to this problem can be written as,
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Φ2 zð Þ pf L; Kð ÞL þ 1−Φ2 zð Þð Þpf L L; Kð Þ ¼ w: ð5Þ
From Eq. (5), we see that the employment level is chosen such that a linear combin-
ation of the value of the average productivity of labour and the value of the marginal
productivity of labour is equal to the wage. If Φ2 = 1, the firm has no influence on de-
termining employment, and the wage will be set equal to the value of the average prod-
uct. If Φ2 = 0, then employment is chosen such that the marginal product of labour
equals the wage.
Thus, Eq. (5) then gives us the employment level as a function of the given real wage,
the producer price, the capital stock and the trade union’s bargaining power:
L ¼ L w; p; K ; Φ2 zð Þð Þ: ð6Þ
The first stage in the negotiation process is where the union and the employer nego-
tiate over wages, given the employment level from the second stage, i.e.
max
w
U w; R; L w; p; K ; Φ2 zð Þð Þð Þ−U0ð ÞΦ1 zð Þ Π L w; p; K ; Φ2 zð Þð Þ; K ; wð Þ−Π0ð Þ1−Φ1 zð Þ
ð7Þ
where Φ1 ∈ [0, 1] is the trade union’s bargaining power in the wage-setting stage. If
Φ1 = 1, the trade union sets the wage, which in combination with Φ2 = 0 gives us
the monopoly model (see e.g. Dunlop 1944).1 If Φ1 and Φ2 are equal, we have the
efficient bargaining model of McDonald and Solow (1981); Manning (1987) notes
that in practice, Φ1 >Φ2 in many real-world unionised labour markets and that dif-
ferent bargaining strengths on different issues are a key source of economic ineffi-
ciencies associated with unionisation.
The first-order condition to Eq. (7) then gives us the equilibrium wage-setting rule,
which can be written as,
w ¼ w L w; p; K ; Φ2 zð Þð Þ; R; Φ1 zð Þð Þ: ð8Þ
Equation (8) indicates that the wage-setting rule, in general, is a function of the em-
ployment level (and, thus, of bargaining power over employment), of the reservation
wage and of bargaining power over the wage.2 Substituting Eq. (8) into (6) then gives
us the equilibrium level of employment, i.e.
L ¼ L w; p; K ; Φ2 zð Þð Þ ¼ L p; K ; R; Φ2 zð Þ; Φ1 zð Þð Þ: ð9Þ
Following Manning (1987), by assuming that u(w) = w, u(R) = R and U0 = R, it can be
shown that
∂L
∂Φ1
≤0;
∂L
∂Φ2
≥0;
∂w
∂Φ1
≥0;
∂w
∂Φ2
?0: ð10Þ
Perhaps surprisingly, we cannot say how the wage is affected by a change in bar-
gaining power over employment without having a more explicit model specification
that lets us determine the wage-setting rule (e.g. if the production function is of a
Cobb-Douglas type, it can be shown that ∂w/∂Φ2 = 0).
Equations (8) and (9) constitute a system of equations describing equilibrium em-
ployment and equilibrium wage determination that can, in principle, be estimated.
A problem, however, is that the bargaining parameters, Φ1 and Φ2, are not directly
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observable. To get around this problem, we will follow the empirical approach de-
veloped by Alogoskoufis and Manning (1991), Doiron (1992) and Vannetelbosch
(1996), in which it is assumed that bargaining power can be expressed as a func-
tion of a vector of exogenous variables, z.
In particular, we are interested in investigating how differences in ownership
affect bargaining power and, ultimately, employment and wage-setting. If the belief
that foreign ownership reduces unions’ bargaining power is correct, we would ex-
pect the bargaining parameters to be lower for foreign-owned firms. However, even
if there is an impact on unions’ bargaining power, it is not clear which of the two
bargaining parameters will be affected the most. Thus, the actual impact of foreign
ownership on the two bargaining parameters is a matter for empirical analysis.
4 Data
The data we used was a panel data set for manufacturing firms in Sweden compiled by
one of the authors. The panel covers the years 1980 to 2005 and consists of all Swedish
manufacturing firms with at least 50 employees. A classification of the industries in
question is given in Table 3 in the Appendix. Since the classification of industries chan-
ged during the period studied, only firms that belonged to the same industry in both
classification systems (SNI69 and SNI92) were included, and in order to permit analysis
of effects over time, only firms with at least five consecutive observations were retained
in the dataset. In Sweden, 242 firms met all these requirements and were thus included
in the dataset. To be classified as foreign-owned, more than 50 % of the votes in the
company had to be held by foreigners.
The variables used in the study are presented in Table 4 of the Appendix, with their
definitions. The data for wages, employment and capital for each firm were collected
from each respective firm’s annual report, which by law have to be submitted to the
Swedish Companies Registration Office. The number of employees in the data set
covers both white- and blue-collar workers, while the trade union data (discussed
below) cover blue-collar workers (see e.g. Huttunen 2007). This could give us a bias in
the measure of wages, since salaries for white-collar workers are significantly higher
than those for their blue-collar counterparts (see e.g. Huttunen 2007). However, in our
case, this is a minor problem since all the firms in the data set are quite large plants
and blue-collar workers dominate their labour forces. The variables that are assumed
to affect the bargaining power through the Φ1 and Φ2 functions are, in addition to
country-specific ownership, trade union density in the industry and openness; these re-
veal how open the respective industries are to international trade. To calculate the
measure of openness for each industry, defined as (export + import)/total sales (see e.g.
Leamer 1987), data on exports, imports and total sales in each industry were collected
from Statistics Sweden’s industry statistics. The average unemployment level for each
trade union’s membership was obtained from Swedish Public Employment Service sta-
tistics. Data on union density were collected from the respective trade union’s annual
reports, and the matching between trade unions and companies was based on trade
union representation in companies, as reported in such unions’ annual reports.
From Fig. 2, we can see that the share of foreign-owned firms in the sample increased
sharply—from a level of about 5 % in 1980 to approximately 13 % in 2005. It is also
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clear from Fig. 1 that most foreign owners of the sample companies originated from
European countries.
5 Econometric specification
To test our hypothesis concerning differences in bargaining power between trade
unions and firms with different owners, we estimated the derived wage and em-
ployment equations simultaneously. Equations (6) and (8) in Section 2 gave us the
following system:
w ¼ w L; R; Φ1 z1ð Þð Þ
L ¼ L w; p; K ; Φ2 z2ð Þð Þ:
In addition to the country-specific ownership of the firm, the bargaining power
Φ1(z1) in the wage equation is assumed to be a function of the industries’ union dens-
ity, the industries’ openness to international trade and the fraction of trade unionists
living on unemployment benefits. The bargaining power Φ2(z2) in the employment
equation includes the same set of variables as Φ1(z1), with the exception of the fraction
of trade unionists living on unemployment benefits. We have chosen to exclude this
variable due to the short-run dependence between the number of workers in a firm
and unemployment in the industry.
The lowest mean wage per employee is consistently found among workers in the pulp,
paper and paperboard industry. The reservation wage at time t has, therefore, been speci-
fied as the lowest observed wage per employee among these workers at time t.
In specifying the simultaneous equation system, we consider a non-linear specifica-
tion of the Φ functions. This is to ensure that the bargaining power lies between 0 and
1 and to facilitate the analysis of the trade union’s bargaining power. The system is spe-
cified as a one-way error component model, as follows:
wit ¼ Litβ1 þ x1itγ1 þΦ1t z1it ; ρ1ð Þ þ μ1i þ v1it ; i ¼ 1;…; N
Lit ¼ witβ2 þ x2itγ2 þΦ2t z2it ; ρ2ð Þ þ μ2i þ v2it; t ¼ 1;…; T
where μi is an unobservable individual-specific effect, vit is the remainder disturbance
in respective equation, x1it = Rit, x2it = [pit, Kit] and γ
0
2 ¼ γ
0
p; γ
0
K
h i
. The Φ functions are
Fig. 2 Foreign ownership, 1980–2005 (%)
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specified as logistic distribution functions, Φ1(z1) = 1/[1 + exp(−z1ρ1)] and Φ2(z2) = 1/[1 +
exp(−z2ρ2)], so that Φ1 ∈ [0, 1] and Φ2 ∈ [0, 1].
Before estimation, the original data are transformed into deviations from their time
mean, such that the typical element of the wage series, for example, becomes w∘it ¼ wit−wi ,
with wi ¼ T−1
XT
s¼1wis . Although this within-group transformation eliminates time-
invariant regressors, a constant is still needed in each equation since E[Φk(zk)] ≠ 0. All vari-
ables, except the ones included in zk [k = 1, 2], were log-transformed (this is in line with
previous empirical studies, see e.g. Alogoskoufis and Manning (1991) or Vannetelbosch
(1996)). To both equations, we also added a linear time trend.
The within-group estimation of the non-linear simultaneous equation systems was
carried out by the generalised method of moments (GMM), using Z∘ ¼ x∘1; x∘2; z
 
as in-
struments.3 The variables that are used as instruments are the output price (producer
price index), trade union density, openness, unemployment level, time and each
dummy for owner’s domicile. A general description of simultaneous equation estima-
tion is given in Hausman (1983), for example, while a description of non-linear GMM
estimation of simultaneous equations based on panel data can be found in Arellano
(2003), among others. To account for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, we use a
Newey and West estimator of the covariance matrix. The covariance matrix was ad-
justed to account for the non-estimated fixed effects.
6 Results
The estimation results are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Two sets of models are esti-
mated: one where all foreign-owned firms are examined jointly and one where they are
separated by the owners’ domicile. The F test indicates that we cannot reject the hy-
pothesis that all foreign firms can be examined jointly. In the calculations of the Newey
and West covariance matrix, autocovariances of lag 1 are used since the test statistics
show the error terms in both equations follow an AR1 process.
If we study the wage equation first, we can see from Table 1 that a higher reser-
vation wage will increase wages, as expected; a 1 % increase in the reservation
wage increases the actual wage by a quarter of a per cent. We can also see that
the number of employees in a firm has a significantly positive effect on wages,
which indicates that, on average, larger companies pay higher wages to their em-
ployees, although this effect is weaker than that of the reservation wage. Not sur-
prisingly, higher unemployment in a sector reduces the bargaining power of the
union in that sector.
The effects of foreign ownership on bargaining power over the wage negotiation are
unclear, however: half of the dummies for owner’s domicile have positive and half have
negative effects on wages, but few are statistically significant. The only exceptions are
Denmark, which is positively significant, and Norway and Finland, which are both sig-
nificantly negative; the dummies for all other countries are insignificant. In the partial
model, where all foreign-owned firms are studied jointly, the dummy for foreign owner-
ship is not statistically significant. Thus, there is no clear evidence that foreign owner-
ship affects unions’ bargaining power over wages.
Turning to the employment equation (Table 2), we can observe that an increase in
the wage rate has a negatively significant effect on employment, while a larger capital
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stock increases employment. A higher producer price will also have a significant positive
effect. These results are all in line with expectations. Increased openness has a negative
impact on employment. As regards the effect on bargaining power, we can see that only a
few of the country dummies are significant, while the joint dummy in the partial model is
not statistically significant. Thus, as with wages, there is no clear evidence that foreign
ownership affects unions’ bargaining power over employment.
Considering the composite effect from increases in z1 and z2, the estimation results are
consistent with the first three derivatives in Eq. (10), i.e. ∂L*/∂Φ1 < 0, ∂L*/∂Φ2 > 0 and ∂w*/
∂Φ1 > 0. The fourth derivative that could not be signed in (10), i.e. the effect on wages due to
an increase in the trade union’s bargaining power over employment, is positive: ∂w*/∂Φ2 > 0.
The results indicate that the point estimate of trade unions’ bargaining power over wages
is greater than the point estimate of their bargaining power over employment. However,
the difference is not statistically significant, and thus, we cannot reject that the efficient bar-
gaining model holds both for Swedish-owned forms and (since we find no significant over-
all effect of foreign ownership on bargaining strength) for foreign-owned firms.
7 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we used a sequential bargaining model between firms and trade unions to
study the effects of foreign ownership on wages and employment. The hypothesis is that
Table 1 Estimation results for the wage equation (GMM estimation)
Partial model Full model
Estimate Standard error Estimate Standard error
Reservation wage 0.2544*** 0.0146 0.2457*** 0.0144
Employment 0.1273*** 0.0336 0.1251*** 0.0329
Openness −0.0275 0.0385 −0.0267 0.0356
Union density 0.4830 0.3909 0.3255 0.2854
Unemployment level −3.39 × 10−5*** 2.84 × 10−6 −2.59 × 10−5*** 9.97 × 10−6
Foreign ownership 0.1484 0.1879 – –
Austria and Switzerland – – −0.0661 0.0803
Belgium and Netherlands – – 0.0760 0.0800
Denmark – – 0.3669*** 0.1247
UK and Ireland – – −0.0001 0.0779
Finland – – −0.2341*** 0.0723
France – – −0.0256 0.0741
Germany – – 0.1004 0.0826
Italy – – 0.1438 0.1420
Norway – – −0.3835*** 0.1136
US and Canada – – 0.0253 0.0697
Time 0.0391*** 0.0014 0.0417*** 0.0014
Constant −78.5236*** 2.7232 −1.1153*** 0.0622
Mean Φ1 0.6641
*** 0.1095a 0.566 0.0588a
R-squared 0.6839 0.6879
Durbin-Watson 1.1215 1.1134
F test 5.5905
***0.1 % level
aThe Delta method was used to calculate the standard errors
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the bargaining power of the trade union may differ depending on the management and
ownership of the firm. One advantage of the sequential bargaining approach is that the bar-
gaining power of the trade unions and firms is allowed to differ between the wage-setting
stage and the employment negotiations.
Openness turned out to have a significant effect in the employment-setting model but
not in the wage-setting model. Union density has a positive sign in both the wage and the
employment equation but is not significant in either equation. The results from the wage
equation also indicate that increased unemployment will reduce the bargaining power for
the trade union and drive wages down. Moreover, the results indicate that the trade union’s
bargaining power over wages is the same as (or at least not significantly different from) its
bargaining power over employment. Manning (1987) argues that differences in bargaining
power between different issues are a key driver of inefficiencies linked to unionisation, so
the fact that we find no evidence of such differences is an interesting result in its own right.
However, the key topic of our study was the effect of foreign ownership on unions’ bar-
gaining strength. Our results indicate that foreign ownership has no statistically significant
impact on unions’ bargaining power over employment or wages. Thus, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that both factors are unaffected by the ownership of the firm. Some previous
studies have found higher wages in foreign-owned firms than in domestically owned firms;
we find no such effect.
Table 2 Estimation results for the employment equation (GMM estimation)
Partial model Full model
Estimate Standard error Estimate Standard error
Wage −0.3592*** 0.0731 −0.3009*** 0.0724
Capital 0.2956*** 0.0136 0.2807*** 0.0130
Producer price index 0.2277*** 0.0806 0.1800*** 0.0797
Openness −0.1217*** 0.0495 −0.1064*** 0.0401
Union density 0.8677 0.5560 0.7273* 0.3658
Foreign ownership 0.1735 0.2542 – –
Austria and Switzerland 0.1444 0.1162
Belgium and Netherlands 0.1797 0.0970
Denmark 0.1307 0.1372
UK and Ireland −0.2233*** 0.0859
Finland −0.1049 0.0820
France 0.0543 0.0987
Germany 0.0130 0.0773
Italy −0.2355 0.1939
Norway −0.0741 0.1194
US and Canada 0.0502 0.0708
Time 2.16 × 10−3 2.25 × 10−3 0.0010 0.0022
Constant −4.9627 4.4617 −0.6338*** 0.0818
Mean Φ2 0.6036
*** 0.083a 0.6424*** 0.0702a
R-squared 0.3216 0.3331
Durbin-Watson 0.4385 0.7626
F test 7.5218
***0.1 % level; *5 % level
aThe Delta method was used to calculate the standard errors
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Sweden previously had a number of regulations that limited FDI. The era of deregula-
tion worried many because of concerns about impacts of foreign ownership—especially
as regards the setting of wages (but also impacts on employment). Similar concerns
have been raised in many other countries. The approach we applied in this study made
it possible to test whether foreign ownership has in fact impacted on union bargaining
power over wages and employment. Our study shows that foreign ownership in Sweden
over the period in question had no significant impact on either of these variables, sug-
gesting that the concerns about foreign ownership may have been unfounded.
Endnotes
1If Φ1 < 1 and Φ2 = 0, we have the right-to-manage model.
2If the production function is of a Cobb-Douglas type, it can be shown that the wage-
setting rule is independent of the employment level and, hence, also independent of
Φ2, bargaining power over employment (see e.g. Manning 1987).
3We have excluded trade union members living on unemployment benefits from the
instrumental set since this variable may be endogenous for the labour equation.
Appendix
Table 3 Industries included in the data set
SIC Industries
154,155 and 158 Manufacture of
• Vegetable and animal oils and fats,
• Dairy products, and
• Other food products
211 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard
241 Manufacture of basic chemicals
243,245 and 246 Manufacture of
• Paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and mastics,
• Soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations, perfume and toilet
preparations, and
• Other chemical products
261 Manufacture of glass and glass products
265, 266 and 268 Manufacture of
• Cement, lime and plaster,
• Articles of concrete, plaster and cement, and
• Other non-metallic mineral products
272, 273 and 274 Manufacture of
• Tubes,
• Other first processing of iron and steel, and
• Basic precious and non-ferrous metals
282 and 283 Manufacture of
• Tanks, reservoirs and containers of metals, central heating radiators and boilers, and
• Steam generators, except central heating hot water boilers
286, 291 and 295 Manufacture of
• Cutlery, tools and general hardware,
• Machinery for the production and use of mechanical power, except aircraft, vehicle
and cycle engines, and
• Other special purpose machinery
313 and 314 Manufacture of
• Insulated wire and cable, and
• Accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries
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Table 4 Variables and their definitions
Variable Definition
Reservation wage Calculated from the lowest wage (in SEK) in the sample
Employment The number of employed individuals in each firm in each year; employees
include both blue- and white-collar workers
Openness The measure of industry openness; calculated as (total export + total import) /
total sales in each industry and year
Union density Calculated for each trade union, the number of members (excluding supporting
members) divided by total employment in the industry (the link between
industry and trade union is determined using each trade union’s definition of
their members according to their annual reports)
Wage The real wage, calculated as nominal wage divided by the consumer price index
Capital The value of physical capital (machinery, buildings and inventories) divided by
the PPI
PPI Producer price index
Unemployment level The average unemployment level in per cent for each trade union’s membership,
as obtained from Swedish Public Employment Service statistics
Foreign ownership A dummy variable: 1 for foreign-owned, 0 for domestic-owned
Austria and Switzerland A dummy variable for owner’s domicile: 1 for Austria or Switzerland, 0 for all others
Belgium and Netherlands A dummy variable for owner’s domicile: 1 for Belgium or The Netherlands,
0 for all others
Denmark A dummy variable for owner’s domicile: 1 for Denmark, 0 for all others
UK and Ireland A dummy variable for owner’s domicile: 1 for UK or Ireland, 0 for all others
Finland A dummy variable for owner’s domicile: 1 for Finland, 0 for all others
France A dummy variable for owner’s domicile: 1 for France, 0 for all others
Germany A dummy variable for owner’s domicile: 1 for Germany, 0 for all others
Italy A dummy variable for owner’s domicile: 1 for Italy, 0 for all others
Norway A dummy variable for owner’s domicile: 1 for Norway, 0 for all others
US and Canada A dummy variable for owner’s domicile: 1 for the USA or Canada, 0 for all others
Time A trend variable
Table 5 Sample statistics; standard deviations in brackets
Employment Real
wage
Real
capital
Trade union
density
Openness Unemployment
level
Producer price
index (PPI)
Obs.
315(394) 272(147) 95 117(199 378) 0.8151(0.0690) 1.0474(0.5952) 0.0590(0.0303) 1.983(0.502) 4379
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Table 6 Share of owner’s domiciles within the data set (%)
Year Sweden (%) Austria/Switzerland (%) Belgium/Netherlands (%) Denmark (%) UK/Ireland (%) Finland (%) France (%) Germany (%) Italy (%) Norway (%) US/Canada (%)
1980 60.0 2.9 1.4 0.7 5.7 1.4 2.1 4.3 0.0 1.4 5.7
1981 59.6 2.8 2.1 0.7 5.0 1.4 2.8 4.3 0.0 1.4 6.4
1982 59.0 3.5 2.8 0.7 4.9 1.4 2.8 4.2 0.0 1.4 6.3
1983 56.6 3.1 2.5 0.6 5.0 1.3 2.5 5.7 0.6 0.6 6.9
1984 59.0 3.7 2.5 0.6 4.3 1.2 2.5 4.3 0.6 0.6 6.8
1985 58.6 4.0 2.3 0.6 4.0 1.1 2.3 4.6 0.6 0.6 6.9
1986 55.8 4.4 3.3 1.1 4.4 2.8 2.8 5.0 0.6 0.6 6.1
1987 54.7 4.4 2.8 1.1 3.9 3.3 3.3 5.5 0.6 0.6 6.6
1988 53.0 5.4 3.2 1.1 3.2 3.8 3.8 5.4 0.5 0.5 6.5
1989 50.5 6.8 3.6 1.0 3.6 5.7 3.6 5.2 0.5 0.5 5.7
1990 46.3 8.4 3.4 1.0 3.0 8.4 3.9 5.4 0.5 2.0 5.4
1991 44.7 7.6 4.1 1.5 3.6 8.6 4.6 5.6 0.5 2.5 5.6
1992 43.2 7.5 3.5 1.5 3.0 9.0 4.5 8.0 0.5 3.0 5.5
1993 41.6 6.8 3.7 1.6 4.2 10.5 4.2 7.9 0.5 4.2 5.8
1994 34.0 5.8 8.0 2.7 8.5 11.2 4.3 8.0 0.5 4.8 6.4
1995 31.5 5.7 8.4 1.7 7.3 10.7 3.4 8.4 0.6 4.5 6.2
1996 31.1 6.2 8.9 1.7 7.8 10.6 3.3 7.8 0.6 4.4 6.7
1997 30.0 6.2 8.9 1.7 8.3 11.1 4.4 8.9 0.6 3.9 7.3
1998 29.0 6.9 8.5 1.7 9.1 11.4 4.0 9.1 0.6 4.5 6.9
1999 28.6 6.0 8.3 1.2 10.1 13.7 4.2 8.3 1.2 4.2 7.1
2000 27.4 6.1 9.1 1.2 9.8 12.8 4.3 7.9 1.2 4.3 7.9
2001 26.8 5.9 9.8 1.3 10.5 11.8 4.6 7.2 1.3 4.6 9.2
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Table 6 Share of owner’s domiciles within the data set (%) (Continued)
2002 26.9 5.5 10.4 1.4 9.0 13.1 4.8 7.6 1.4 4.1 9.7
2003 25.7 5.7 10.7 1.4 8.6 13.6 5.0 7.1 1.4 4.3 10.0
2004 25.6 6.1 12.1 1.5 7.5 13.5 4.5 7.5 1.5 4.5 10.5
2005 26.0 7.1 11.8 1.6 6.3 11.8 5.5 7.9 1.6 3.9 11.0
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